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Landlords entitled to setoff security deposit after
expiration of statute of limitations
By Sandra D. Berzups
In the class action Granberry v. Islay Investments,
889 P.2d 970 (Cal. 1995), the California Supreme Court
en banc held that landlords were entitled to automati-
cally setoff security deposits against unpaid rents,
cleaning, and repair costs even when the landlords, in
good faith, failed to return security deposits to tenants
within a certain time period as mandated by statute.
However, if the security deposit is not returned within
three weeks of the tenancy termination date, the land-
lords must prove that such damages were suffered by a
preponderance of evidence at an evidentiary hearing.
The court remanded the case for the trial court to
reconsider the choice of remedy for distributing wrong-
fully withheld deposits and for assessing attorney's fees.
Excess fees above rent are considered a security
deposit
From 1978 to 1981, Islay Investments ("Islay"), the
owners and operators of 1200 residential rental units in
the Santa Barbara area, added approximately $100 to
tenant rental fees for the first 31 days of tenancy, which
aggregated to a total of $1 million. Islay never returned
this fee to the tenants nor gave written accountings for
the retention on the basis that such fee constituted a part
of the first month's rental payment. A class of former
tenants sued for a refund of this amount.
California landlord-tenant law provides that a
landlord must return the security deposit paid by a
former tenant within three weeks after the termination of
tenancy and provide a written accounting of any portion
retained as compensation for unpaid rent, repairs, and
cleaning. The purpose of the statute, especially Section
1950.5, was to ensure the speedy return of security
deposits upon the termination of tenancy and to prevent
the improper retention of such deposits. The district
court determined that this section did not apply because
the increased rent paid in the first month was in fact rent
and not a security deposit. The court of appeals reversed,
stating the character of the supplemental payment was a
triable issue of fact.
On remand, Islay argued that it was entitled to setoff
amounts for unpaid rents, cleaning, and repair if the
increased rental payments were deemed a refundable
security deposit. The trial court found that the excess
rental payments were indeed security deposits within the
meaning of Section 1950.5, but that Islay did not have
the right to setoff due to its failure to return such
amounts in a timely manner. The court awarded costs
and attorney's fees to plaintiffs, which would be
recovered from the aggregate amount to be paid by
Islay, not to exceed 25 percent. Upon appeal. the court
of appeals ruled that the trial court erred in denying Islay
the right to setoff. However, the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in limiting costs and attorney's fees to 25
percent and in granting refunds only to those class
members who came forward to claim them. The
California supreme court granted certiorari to resolve the
issue of whether the landlords had the right to setoff,
notwithstanding their good-faith lack of compliance
with Section 1950.5.
Landlord's right to setoff spelled out
Upon analysis of 1950.5, the court concluded that
when the landlord did not provide a timely written
accounting of the retained portion of the security
deposit, the landlord must return the entire deposit to the
tenant. Islay asserted that because the legislature
provided a remedy only for bad faith retention of a
security deposit, landlords that retain security deposits in
good faith should not be penalized by being barred from
retaining setoff. The plaintiffs countered that this result
would be inconsistent with principles of equity and
public policy because a landlord may use such a defense
to keep all or part of the security deposits and profit
from its own wrong in violation of Section 1950.5. The
plaintiffs further contended that setoff would be inappro-
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priate in a class action due to numerous practical
difficulties associated with the size of the class and the
relatively small amount involved per claim.
In view of these arguments, the California supreme
court affirmed the court of appeals' judgment. The court
concluded that although the landlord failed to avail itself
of the deduct-and-retain procedure, all its other rights to
claim damages in an evidentiary hearing could not be
denied so long as the landlord has met the burden of
proof as to the reasonableness of the amounts claimed.
The court reasoned that this burden is sufficiently great,
especially with the lapse of time, so as not to allow the
landlord to profit from his own wrong. The court also
noted that Islay should not be deprived of its substantive
rights to meet this burden of proof due to the litigation
posture the class-action plaintiffs took. The court also
stated that on remand it may be possible to shape a
remedy that will avoid many of the problems the
plaintiffs have identified as well as to determine whether
defendant's claims are barred by any of the generally
applicable equitable affirmative defenses of laches,
unclean hands, and estoppel.
Fluid recovery method considered to compensate
tenants
The trial court originally determined that the fluid
recovery method should be used to compensate the
entire class for the landlord's retention of the excess
rental payment. The implementation of this method
involves three steps: (1) defendant pays total liability
into a class fund; (2) individual class members collect
the damages they can prove; and (3) the fund distributes
any excess "by one of several practical procedures
developed by the courts." The court noted that the trial
court on remand must reevaluate whether the fluid
recovery method is appropriate in light of the forthcom-
ing evidentiary hearing on defendants' claim of setoff.
In addition, the trial court will need to determine
whether attorney's fees in the amount of 25 percent of the
aggregate class recovery is adequate when the amount of
defendants' offsets have not been calculated.
Dissent criticizes landlord's setoff rights
In a separate dissenting opinion, Justice Kennard
disagreed with the majority's interpretation that the
language of Section 1950.5 did not bar setoff claims
against security deposits in subsequent actions by the
tenant, even when the statutory period to deduct-and-
retain had lapsed. Justice Kennard stated that the plain
language of Section 1950.5 provides that the landlord
should forfeit any and all rights to setoff claims against
the security deposit if the landlord does not do so within
the statutory period. He opined that the legislative
history behind 1950.5 was meant to level the playing
field between the tenant, who often faced insurmount-
able obstacles to file a claim, and the recalcitrant
landlord who often had the upper hand in such a
relationship. In effect, by telling the landlord, "claim it
or lose it," Justice Kennard suggests that if a landlord
wishes to pursue recourse after the statute of limitations
has expired, he still is able to do so in an independent
suit against the tenant. In addition, he contended that a
limitations period for asserting claims and right to setoff
should not be construed as a penalty, but, rather a
necessity by implication for any statutory violation
which includes improper retention of security deposit
accompanied by bad faith.
Finally, Justice Kennard disagreed with the trial
court's limitation on the landlord's liability to only the
amounts owed to those class members who may come
forward and submit individual claims. He contended that
the proper measure of the class recovery is the landlord's
total liability to the entire class, not merely the amounts
that individual class member may step forward to claim.
In effect, Justice Kennard concluded that the trial court
narrowed the class without notice by extinguishing the
causes of action of non-claiming class members.
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